W hy has the progress of scientific knowledge in economics proceeded at a pace that is slower than that of the natural sciences? A possible reason is the limitation of data, in quantity and quality; in addition, the instruments of measurement for the social phenomena are relatively imperfect. The other reason seems to rest upon the role of methodology in the construction of scientific knowledge in economics. Compared to physics, economics seeks to explain the functioning of the social world, which is a much more complex world than the physical world; one may then propose the principle that understanding more complex worlds, such as the social world, is more demanding on methodology than understanding the physical world.
Economist Paul Samuelson wrote in his classic book Foundations of Economic Analysis about this principle as follows:
[This] book may hold some interest for the reader who is curious about the methodology of the social sciences . . . [I]n a hard, exact science [as physics] a practitioner does not really have to know much about methodology. Indeed, even if he is a definitely misguided methodologist, the subject itself has a self-cleansing property which renders harmless his aberrations. By contrast, a scholar in economics who is fundamentally confused concerning [methodology] may spend a lifetime shadow-boxing with reality. In a sense, therefore, in order to earn his daily bread as a fruitful contributor to knowledge, the practitioner of an intermediately hard science like economics must come to terms with methodological problems. (1947, pp. viii-ix) If the separation between physics and economics made by Samuelson as hard and intermediately hard sciences was transformed into complex (economics) and less complex (physics), as will be done in this book, then the principle proposed above would follow. Economics is a more methodologyintensive science than physics.
Methodology is another name for epistemology (from the Greek episteme, knowledge). Epistemology deals with the logic of scientific knowledge, from which a practical set of rules to arrive at scientific knowledge can be derived. Such a set of rules is needed in economics. Popperian epistemology will be used for this purpose, from which the set of scientific rules-called the alpha-beta method-will be derived. The method is presented in this chapter and will then be applied in the entire book. (This chapter draws heavily on Figueroa [2012] .)
Deriving Scientific Rules from Popperian Epistemology
Scientific knowledge seeks to establish relations among objects and explain them. The objects can be mental or physical. Formal sciences study the relations among mental objects, whereas factual sciences study the relations among material objects. Mathematics and logic are examples of formal sciences; physics and economics are instances of factual sciences.
Scientific knowledge can be seen as a set of propositions that is error free. What would be the criterion to accept or reject a proposition as scientific? It depends upon the type of science. In the formal sciences, the criterion seems to be rather straightforward: the relations established must be free of internal logical contradictions. In the factual sciences, by contrast, the criteria are more involved. The propositions of a factual science must be free of internal logical contradictions as well. However, this criterion constitutes just a necessary condition; empirical consistency between the propositions and the facts will also be required. The real world cannot be explained by using deductive logic alone. This is the logic that corresponds to formal sciences, not to factual sciences.
According to the epistemology developed by Karl Popper (1968), scientific knowledge that seeks to explain the real world cannot be attained by using inductive logic. There is no such thing as inductive logic, that is, there is no logical way to go from particular empirical observations to general relations. His classical example is: no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white.
The logic of scientific knowledge developed by Popper can be summarized as follows: Theory (an abstract world) is needed to explain the real
